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 When U.S. citizens, like photographers and journalists, are killed 
by acts of terrorism abroad while performing their jobs, it sends 
shockwaves through the American home front. “[In] the long term, the 
sudden death of a loved one may manifest itself as ‘a deep inner 
feeling of pain and anguish often borne in silence.”’
1
 Thus, the pain 
and anguish of a loved one may manifest itself as the Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) although individuals react 
differently under like circumstances.
2
 
 Foreign nationals face many challenges when filing civil claims, 
like IIED, in U.S. courts against foreign states.
3
  Foreign nationals are 
faced with the difficult task of breaking through jurisdictional 
roadblocks under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in 
an effort to hold the foreign state liable for conduct that seriously 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; M.S., Criminal Justice; B.A., Political Science; Dean’s List 
honoree. 
1
 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing 
Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1972)). 
2
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harmed or caused death to a U.S. citizen relative.
4
 Remedies, such as 
the ability to sue a foreign state for supporting terrorist acts, help to 
maintain uniformity in U.S. courts and conformity with international 
law litigation.
5
   
 Before a U.S. state or federal court can hear a case, it has to 
exercise jurisdiction over the claim.  The court is able to resolve the 
issue if there is a “case or controversy” between adverse parties with 
legal standing to bring the suit.
6
  Specifically, U.S. federal courts 
“shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
7
 The FSIA, a 
federal statute, provides the “sole basis” for asserting jurisdiction over 
foreign states.
8
  The FSIA allows a court to remove an essential state 
law claim from state to federal court through subject matter 
jurisdiction.
9
  Moreover, the FSIA provides that “in personam 
jurisdiction over a foreign stated defendant has been accommodated 
inherently in the statute for the acts enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(7).”
10
 Under this statute, U.S. courts have the power to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over claims against foreign state 




 Regardless of the United States’ jurisdiction, foreign states enjoy 
sovereign immunity under the FSIA
12
 unless the foreign national (or 
                                                 
4
 Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012). 
5
 14A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §3662 (3d 
ed. 1998). 
6




  Fed. R. Civ. P. 1331.  
8
  Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
9
  Id. 
10
 Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
11
 Id. (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 19-23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998)). 
12
  Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 USC § 1605(a)(7) (2002). 
2
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claimant) asserts an exception, such as the state-sponsored terrorism 
exception.
13
  Foreign states are treated like the U.S. under the FSIA.
14
 
Neither sovereign can have a default judgment entered against it—or a 
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of it—unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory 
to the court.
15
  Essentially, the claimant must plead a cause-of-action 
that the court can redress. 
 If a cause-of-action is properly plead by showing substantial 
evidence that the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the terrorist 
act, a United States citizen, and the foreign state was designated as a 
state sponsor of terrorism, U.S. federal courts can exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction over claims which cause death or injury to U.S. 
citizens. 
16
  Subject-matter jurisdiction created a roadblock to recovery 
for the Leibovitch family during their suit against the Republic of Iran 
in U.S. federal court.
17
 
 In that case, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the FSIA and its state-
sponsored terrorism exception to determine whether subject matter 
jurisdiction over essential state law claims against a foreign state 
existed.
18
  In Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, foreign family 
members brought suit in a U.S. federal court for injuries that resulted 
from Iran’s material support of terrorist actions.
19
 The district court 
dismissed the claims brought by the other members of the Leibovitch 
family, asserting that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their 
claims because they were not U.S. citizens.
20
  The Leibovitches 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that subject matter 
                                                 
13




  Michael Rosenhouse, J.D., State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to 
Immunity of Foreign States and their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002) (citing n. 29). 
16
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 570.  
17
 Id. at 561-62. 
18
 Id. at 561.  
19
 Id. at 562-63. 
20
 Id. at 563. 
3
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jurisdiction existed over their IIED claims arising from S.L.’s injuries 
under Israeli law because of S.L.’s status as an American citizen.
21
  
 This article analyzes the FSIA and the state-sponsored terrorism 
exception to determine whether the Seventh Circuit correctly reversed 
the district court.  This Comment proposes that the Seventh Circuit 
correctly reversed the district court and found that the court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Leibovitch’s case.  Moreover, 
this Comment argues that S.L. could recover because she is a victim 
under the state-sponsored terrorism exception. The Comment will 
proceed as follows. Part I provides an overview of the FSIA.  Part II 
addresses case law that helped shape the current state-sponsored 
terrorism exception.   Then, Part III will analyze the current effect of 
the state-sponsored terrorism exception, and explain why the Seventh 
Circuit correctly reversed the district court’s ruling.  However, to 
comprehend the court’s decision, one must understand the FSIA and 
the basis for asserting an exception under the Act. 
 
I. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT & U.S. JURISDICTION 
 
A. The FSIA 
 
 The FSIA originated in 1976 when foreign states could easily 
bypass civil liability to personal injury suits by raising foreign 
sovereign immunity.
22
  Specifically, there were “uncertainties [of] then 
current American judicial practices and Department of State policies 
with regard to a foreign nation's sovereign immunity.”
23
  Because of 
those uncertainties, U.S. courts refused to extend the sovereign 
immunity exception beyond commercial activities to reach public acts 





 44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 83 (2013); Israel Law Center, FSIA, 





 Wright, supra note 5.   
4
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  As a result, “foreign states [used] the FSIA as a 
shield against civil liability for violations of the law of nations 
committed against [U.S.] nationals overseas.”
25
  “Consequently, 
American victims of International terrorism were deterred from suing 
foreign states that supported terrorist organizations” if they could not 
point to the commercial activities exception under the FSIA.
26
  To 
combat against international terrorism against U.S. citizens, the state-
sponsored terrorism exception was enacted.   
 
B. The State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception27 and Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction. 
 
 To disassemble the FSIA’s shield, victims needed a sword that 
would pierce the FSIA’s protection and permit subject matter 
jurisdiction over their claims.  In 1996, as part of the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act, (AEDPA), Congress passed a 
terrorism exception to the FSIA that granted American citizens the 
right to sue foreign states designated as “State Sponsors of 
Terrorism.
28
  Congress’s purpose in lifting the sovereign immunity 
                                                 
 
24
 44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 83 (2013); See Flatow v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (1998). 
 
25
 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
  
26
 Israel Law Center, FSIA (February 4, 2013, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.israellawcenter.org/hebrew/page.asp?id=334&show=reports#Foreign.  
      
27
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(h)(6) (2008); see Michael Rosenhouse, J.D., 
Annotation, State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign States and 
their Property under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 
§ 2.1 (2002) (State-Sponsored Terrorism means “a country the government of which 
the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S. C. App. 2405(j), section 620A of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act 
(22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.”). 
           
28
 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008)) (a “foreign state 
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the 
States in any case to otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages 
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an 
5
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under the AEDPA was to “affect the conduct of terrorist states outside 
the U.S. [by promoting] safety of U.S. citizens who travel overseas.”
29
  
As a result of the AEDPA, raising sovereign immunity as a shield 
against U.S. jurisdiction was eradicated.
30
  Foreign states could not 
assert sovereign immunity where a victim claims money damages for 









 or the provision of 
                                                                                                                   
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision 
of material support or resources (as defined in 2339A of title 18) for such an act if 
such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or 
agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 




 44B Am. Jur. 2d, International Law § 140 (2013).  
30
 Id. 
          
31
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(e)(1) (2008) (defines “torture” pursuant to the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991, §3(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (b), as “any act, directed 
against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe 
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that 
individual or third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind.”). 
 
32
 See id. (defining extrajudicial killing pursuant to the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of  1991, §3(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (a) as “a deliberated killing not 
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”  This term “does not include any such killing that, under 
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.”). 
 
33
 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation art. I, 
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565(1)  (defining aircraft sabotage and declaring that if 
any person commits an offence unlawfully and intentionally, such as:  
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if 
that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or  
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which 
renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in 
flight; or 
6
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material support or resources
35
 “for such an act if the act or provision 
is engaged in by an [official] or agent of [the] foreign state while 
acting within the scope of his or her office [] or agency.”
36
 Essentially, 
the state-sponsored terrorism exception dismantled jurisdictional 
roadblocks by giving U.S. federal courts the power to exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign states.
37
 
                                                                                                                   
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means 
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or 
to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause 
damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety inflight; or 
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their 
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; 
or  
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby 
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.  
This article also makes an individual liable if under subsection 2(b), that 
individual “is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any 
such offence” as stated in section 1.  
  
34
 See Terrorism Taking of Hostages Convention Between the United States 
and other Governments, art. 1, June 3, 1983,  T.I.A.S. No. 11081 (stating that  
 “[any] person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to 
detain another person ([“hostage”]), in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, 
an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a 
group of person, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages 
within the meaning of this Convention.”). 
          
35
 28 U.S.C.A. § 2339A (2009) (material support or resources “means 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 




 44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 140 (2013). 
37
 See Fisher v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 541 F. Supp. 
2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (conferring subject matter jurisdiction over Libya in an action 
arising out of a bombing of an airliner over Scotland); see also Kilburn v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 699 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (where the court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims for personal injury and wrongful death 
after victim of terrorist actions was kidnapped and ultimately killed in Iran). 
7
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 Moreover, the district court exercises original jurisdiction as to 
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state where the court has 
jurisdiction over the person with respect to which the foreign state is 
not entitled to immunity either under Sections 1605-1607 of the FSIA 
or under any international agreement.
38
 The FSIA protects a foreign 
state from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless a specified exception 
applies; only then will the federal court exercise subject-matter 
jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.
39
 However, once a 
court has the power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the 
suit, it may exercise all powers necessary to resolve the suit and 
enforce whatever judgment it deems proper.
40
  
 In Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the former chief of the 
Iranian armed forces was assassinated by Hezbollah, a terrorist 
organization operating under the Islamic Jihad.
41
  His grandson 
brought a suit on his behalf suing both the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) in the 
U.S. District Court of D.C., claiming IIED and wrongful death.
42
  The 
grandson further alleged that Iran and the MOIS materially supported 
the Islamic Jihad by funding the terrorist group, and thus could not 
assert sovereign immunity.
43
   The district court agreed and found that 
Iran and MOIS were liable for the former chief’s murder.
44
   However, 
after analyzing the grandson’s IIED claim, the district determined that 
he lacked standing to bring suit.
45
  The court further determined that 
because the former chief could not have brought an action if he was 
still alive, the court had to dismiss the grandson’s wrongful-death 
                                                 
38
 Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 240 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 
2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976)). 
39
 Id. at 1149 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)). 
40
 Autotech Technologies LP v. Integral Research & Development Corp., 499 
F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1451 (2008). 
41






 Id. at 839 (citing Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 498 F.Supp.2d 268, 
279 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
45
 Id. (citing Oveissi, 498 F.Supp.2d at 283). 
8
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8
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  The grandson appealed and the D.C. Circuit determined that 
subject-matter jurisdiction existed over the grandson’s claims because 
(1) Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism; (2) the 
grandson was U.S. citizen, and thus able to bring the claim on behalf 




Altogether, the FSIA confers jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims 
presuming the plaintiff pleads an enumerated exception, such as the 
state-sponsored terrorism exception. However, because the FSIA only 
confers jurisdiction for the court to hear the plaintiff’s claim, the 
plaintiff is obligated to plead a sufficient cause of action by pointing to 
a viable state law claim like wrongful death and IIED.  
 
II. CAUSE-OF-ACTION AGAINST A FOREIGN STATE 
 
A. Liability under § 1605(a)(7)—the Flatow Amendment & 
Ciccipio-Puelo. 
 
 A viable claim must be asserted to hold a foreign state liable once 
U.S. courts have the power to exercise jurisdiction: “[The] FSIA is not 
generally intended to affect the substantive law of liability or to affect 
the primary conduct of foreign states.”
48
 Therefore, failing to assert a 
viable cause of action could result in the foreign national’s claims 
being dismissed.  The FSIA does not provide for a substantive cause of 
action or a choice-of-law provision once jurisdiction has been 
asserted.
49
 However, section 1606 under the FSIA provides that where 
a “foreign state [is] stripped of its immunity [‘it] shall be liable in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.”
50
  Therefore, where sovereign immunity is annulled, 
the plaintiff may bring “state law claims that they could have brought 
                                                 
46
 Id. at 839 (citing Oveissi, 498 F.Supp.2d at 279).  
47
 Id. at 844. 
48
 Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2012). 
49
 Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 841. 
50
 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2002)). 
9
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if the defendant were a private individual.”
51
  Since plaintiffs are 
required to indicate a specific substantive law, the FSIA is a conduit of 
state-law principals, thus creating a pass-through effect on liability. 
This section explores the legal impact that the Flatow Amendment 
and Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran had on the state-
sponsored terrorism exception.  The Flatow Amendment, applied in 
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, allowed for increased 
compensatory damages for terrorist victims and made punitive 
damages available against foreign states. Cicippio-Puleo, contrarily, 
refused to recognize a federal right to sue a foreign state without 
pleading a state law claim.   
 
1. The Flatow Amendment and its Role. 
 
 The Flatow Amendment played a huge role in expanding the FSIA 
subsequent to the AEDPA.
52
  The Flatow Amendment was enacted 
under the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act.  It was enacted 
on September 30, 1996 after Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis University 
student who was killed by a suicide bombing in the Gaza strip.”
53
 The 
Flatow Amendment expressly provided for punitive damages in hopes 
of combatting terrorism.
54
 Furthermore, with the Flatow Amendment, 
Congress sought to advance the broader goal of the terrorism 
exception by altering a foreign state’s conduct that engaged in 
terrorism.
55
  Congressman Saxton, an active player in enacting the 
Flatow Amendment, believed that “the only way to achieve the goal of 
altering state conduct ‘was to impose massive civil liability on foreign 
                                                 
51
 Id. at 841. 
52
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 563 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008)).  
53
 Id. at 565 (one purpose of the Flatow Amendment was to increase the 
measure of damages for terrorist victims. After enacting the Flatow Amendment, it 
was essential for Congress to ensure the availability of receiving punitive damages 
against agents of state sponsored terrorism to victims who died as a result of terrorist 
acts, or who were severely injured). 
54
 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
55
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 565. 
10
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state sponsors of terrorism whose conduct results in the death or 
personal injury of United States citizens” by increasing punitive 
damages.
56
  Therefore, the Flatow Amendment sought to expand the 
state-sponsored terrorism exception by increasing punitive damages as 
a means of altering a foreign state’s conduct that materially supports 
terrorist organizations.
57
   
 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran was the first case to apply the 
Flatow Amendment.
58
 In Flatow, Alisa Flatow, a U.S. citizen and 
university student, was killed when a suicide bomber in Israel attacked 
her tourist bus.
59
  Alisa was severely injured by a piece of shrapnel that 
pierced into her skull casing and lodged into her brain.
60
  Alisa 
eventually died from her injuries.
61
  Her family brought a wrongful 
death action on her behalf against Iran and its officials.
62
  The court 
held that, inter alia, the Flatows could recover under a state law theory 
for wrongful death.
63
  In addition, the Flatow Amendment provided a 
federal cause of action by expressly providing for punitive damages in 
wrongful death cases.  
 The Flatow court explained that the Flatow Amendment was a 
departure from the prior state-sponsored terrorism exception because 
the FSIA completely prohibited the recovery of punitive damages 
against a foreign state.
64
   However, the Flatow Amendment 
disregarded that prior prohibition by expressly providing for a cause of 
action for punitive damages because the FSIA was silent on the type of 
remedies available.
65
  Where a terrorism victim brings a claim directly 
against a foreign state under the state sponsored exception and the 
                                                 
56
 Id. at 566. 
57
 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 25-26. 
58
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 565; see Flatow, 999 F.Supp at 1. 
59




 Id. at 7-8. 
62
 Id. at 1. 
63
 Id. at 16, 18. 
64
 Id. at 25. 
65
 Id.  
11
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Flatow Amendment, a foreign state can be indirectly liable for punitive 
damages under the respondeat superior doctrine.
66
  Respondeat 
superior applies where a foreign state “materially supports” a terrorist 
organization because its tortious actions are the fault of the individual 
foreign state.
67
   
 Providing “material support or assistance to a terrorist group” is 
defined as providing currency or other financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, safe houses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical 
assets, but does not include humanitarian assistance to persons not 
directly involved in such violations.
68
   
Consequently, if a foreign state provides routine financial 
assistance to a terrorist group to help advance their terrorist activities, 
that foreign state is vicariously liable for the personal injuries caused 
by that terrorist group.
69
  
 The Flatow court determined that the Flatows’ were entitled to 
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.
70
  In addition 
to finding subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the court found that 
Iran and MOIS were liable because they materially supported and 
provided resources to the terrorist group that caused Alisa’s death. 
After Flatow and the Flatow Amendment, those injured by terrorist 
organizations were afforded a federal cause of action to receive 
                                                 
66
 Id. at 25-26. 
  
67
 Id. at 18. 
  
68
 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), with reference by incorporation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(a) (2009). 
         
69
 See Wachsman ex rel Wachsman v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (where the “Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of 
Information and Security were not immune from suit under [FSIA] for the 
extrajudicial killing a U.S. citizen who was abducted and executed by members of 
terrorist group while residing in Israel; victim’s survivors established that Iran’s 
material support to terrorist group proximately caused victim’s kidnapping and 
execution, that Iran provided sanctioned support for terrorism through the [MOIS], 
and that United States had designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism.”). 
70
 Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 33-34. 
12
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punitive damages in addition to large compensatory damages.  
Punitive damages were sought as a measure of deterrence to illustrate 
to foreign states that their conduct will not be tolerated against U.S. 
citizens.  The following cases are examples of how the Flatow 
Amendment’s large punitive damage awards were applied. 
 For example, in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court held 
that $300,000,000 in punitive damages was an appropriate award 
against Iran and Syria where several people were seriously injured 
during a suicide bombing attack.
71
   The suicide bombing attack took 
place at Rosh Ha’ir restaurant in Tel Aviv, Israel.
72
 A sixteen-year-old 
boy, Daniel Wultz, and his father, Yekutiel “Tuly” Wultz, were among 
those injured by the explosion.
73
  Daniel later died from his injuries; 
his mother and siblings sued Iran and Syria under the state-sponsored 
terrorism exception.
74
  The Wultz court stated that punitive damages 
were made available under the revised FSIA terrorism exception in an 
effort to punish and deter terrorist actions that are supported by foreign 
states.
75
   
 Similarly, in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, $300,000,000 
($150,000,000 per victim) in punitive damages was awarded where 
two contractors were “kidnapped, held hostage, and finally, while their 
captors videotaped the event, viciously slaughtered.”
76
 Their families 
“brought state law claims against Syria, Syrian Military Intelligence, 
President Bashar al-Assad, and director of Military Intelligence Asif 
Shawkat, under the [FSIA].”
77
 The families alleged that the foreign 
                                                 
71







 Id. at 27. 
75
 Id. at 41 (explaining that punitive damages meant to punish outrageous 
behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the future by foreign states).  
76
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state “provided material support” to both Zarqawi and al-Qaeda which 
led to the deaths of the U.S.-citizen contractors.
78
   
 In Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court awarded 
$300,000,000 in punitive damages against Iran for assassinating Rabbi 
Kahane and wounding two American citizens in 1990.
79
  The court 
recognized that although a shooting is less horrific than a bombing, 
both are deadly.
80
  The court stated that “[r]egardless of the severity of 
the act, [it had] no doubt that Iran's intention [] in supporting terrorist 
groups . . . [was] to create maximum harm through terrorist acts.”
81
  
With the aim of deterring further terrorist attacks, large punitive 




Therefore, although the Flatow Amendment was only enacted as a 
note to the state-sponsored terrorism exception, courts applied it as an 
implied amendment; thus, expanding the realms of the FSIA. 
 
2. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Rep. of Iran—There is no Implied 
Federal cause-of-action. 
 
 After the FSIA’s expansion, the D.C. Circuit court refused to 
follow Flatow and established its own position.  In Cicippio-Puleo, the 
D.C. Circuit ruled that Section 1605(a)(7) only allowed waiver of 
immunity and that some other source of law was required to bring a 
claim against a foreign state.
83
  Cicippio-Puleo states that the Flatow 
Amendment only allows “a private right of action to sue “officials, 
employees, and agents of foreign states for the conduct described in 
§1605(a)(7),” which is different from pursuing actions against a 












   
83
 Cicippio-Puelo v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). 
14
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  Section 1605(a)(7) waives sovereign immunity where 
money damages are sought for personal injury or death caused by an 
act of terrorism, but it does not create a private cause of action.  Where 
“an official, employee, or agent of [a] foreign state while acting within 
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency’ is engaged in 
terrorism or materially supporting terrorism, sovereign immunity will 
be deemed waived.”
85
   In essence, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
FSIA creates a pass-through approach; neither §1605(a)(7) nor the 
Flatow Amendment creates a private right of action against a foreign 
government.
86
  Therefore, without a sufficient state law claim, the 
plaintiff risks dismissal without recovery.
87
   
 Mr. Cicippio was a comptroller of the American University of 
Beiruit.
88
  He was kidnapped in Beiruit, Lebanon by a terrorist group 
named Hezbollah, beaten, kept in inhumane cells, and bound by 
chains.
89
  Mr. Cicippio also suffered an array of medical problems and 
he was forced to undergo abdomen surgery from which he bears a ten-
inch scar.
90
  Mr. Cicippio and his wife brought actions against Iran and 
MOIS and were awarded compensatory and punitive damages.  
Thereafter, Mr. Cicippio’s adult children brought suit several years 
later claiming loss of solatium (injury to a person’s feelings) and IIED 
pursuant to the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception and the 
Flatow Amendment.
91
   
 The district court dismissed the children’s claims, stating that the 
court did not have jurisdiction and they failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.
92
  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal, reasoning that “‘[t]he language and 
                                                 
  
84
 Id. at 1029. 
85










 Id. at 1027-28. 
91
 Id. at 1028-30. 
92
 Id. at 1030; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
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history of the FSIA clearly established that the Act was not intended to 
affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or 
instrumentality.’”
93
 The court stated that the Flatow Amendment 
creates a cause of action and it imposes liability, but that liability only 
reaches to “an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated 
as a state sponsor of terrorism.”
94
  The Flatow Amendment does not 
include a foreign state.
95
  The D.C. Circuit stressed its point by 
recognizing that the Flatow Amendment was headed in the right 
direction.
96
 However, the court concluded “it is for Congress, not the 
courts, to decide whether a cause of action should lie against foreign 
states.”
97
  In that instance, the court refused “to imply a clause of 
action against foreign states when Congress has not expressly 




 The Cicippio-Puleo court posits that the “Supreme Court has also 
made it clear that the federal courts should be loathe to ‘imply’ a cause 
of action from a jurisdictional provision that ‘creates no cause of 
action of its own force and effect … [and] imposes no liabilities.’”
99
  
As mentioned previously, the FSIA does not affect substantive 
liability, it only provides subject matter jurisdiction, assuming the 
plaintiff points to an enumerated exception.
100
  Therefore, pleading an 
exception to the FSIA waives sovereign immunity and the plaintiff 
must “state a cause of action under some other source of law, 
including state law,” to impose liability.
101
  
 Other courts soon followed suit and applied Cicippio-Puleo’s 
determination to cases under the FSIA.  For example, Nikbin v. Islamic 
                                                 
93
 Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1033. 
94








 Id. at 1036. 
99
 Id. at 1033 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)). 
100
  Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 11 (D.C. Cir 1998). 
101
 Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1036. 
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Rep. of Iran ruled there is no cause of action against a foreign state 
without creating a cause of action in substantive state law since the 
FSIA only waives the foreign state’s sovereign immunity.
102
  Similarly, 
Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya follows Cicippio-
Puleo’s ruling by stating that Section 1605(a)(7) is ‘“merely a 
jurisdiction-conferring provision that does not otherwise provide a 
cause of action against either a foreign state or its agents.”
103
  There, 
several American citizens were injured when their flight was bombed 
in Brazzaville, Congo.
104
 As a result, six Libyan officers were sued 
civilly and criminally tried.  After the criminal trial, family members 
of the bombing victims brought civil suits claiming IIED and wrongful 
death. Defendants moved for a motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiffs 
need to state claims with particularity. The court agreed and reasoned 
that according to Cicippio-Puleo, their FSIA complaint has to allege 
more in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
105
 
 Taken together, Cicippio-Puleo sought to halt a plaintiff’s ability 
to recover damages over foreign states under the FSIA’s state-
sponsored terrorism exception and the Flatow Amendment.
106
  
Cicippio-Puleo and its progenies required plaintiffs to plead a 
sufficient claim that justifies liability separate from gaining subject 
matter jurisdiction by the FSIA.
107
 Therefore, after Cicippio-Puleo’s 
decision, plaintiffs incurred additional roadblocks in other jurisdictions 
because Congress had not created a federal cause of action against 
foreign states.
108
 The Seventh Circuit’s discussion and analysis of 
Cicippio-Puelo illustrates a curtailing of plaintiffs’ rights; therefore, 
                                                 
102
 Nikbin v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
103
  Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2006 WL 23849151, at 
5* (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032). 
104
 Id. at 1. 
105
 Id. at 5. 
106
 See Cicippio- Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1024. 
107
 Id.; see also Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp. 2d. 1*, 35* 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding as Cicippio-Puelo does that suing a foreign state under 
the FSIA’s exception requires more than a bare bones pleading of a state law cause-
of-action). 
108
 Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1036. 
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Congress responded swiftly by repealing the state-sponsored terrorism 
statute.  
 
B. Amendment and Repealing of §1605(a)(7) by Congress. 
 
 In 2008, Congress amended the Act so its intention would have 
full effect after Cicippio-Puleo interpreted and applied the state-
sponsored terrorism exception so narrowly.
109
 Congress enacted 
section1605A, providing a private right of action under subsection (c) 
where:  
a foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of terrorism 
[] and any official, employee, or agent of that foreign 
state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency, shall be liable to—(1) a 
national of the United States, (2) a member of the 
armed forces, (3) an employee of the Government of 
the United States, or of an individual performing a 
contract awarded by the United States Government, 
acting within the scope of the employee’s employment, 
or (4) the legal representative of a person described in 
paragraph[s] (1), (2), or (3), for personal injury or death 
caused by acts described in subsection (a)(1) of that 
foreign state, or of an official, employee of that foreign 
state, for which the courts of the United States may 
maintain jurisdiction under this section for money 
damages.  In any such action, damages may include 
economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and 
punitive damages.  In any such action, a foreign state 
shall be vicariously liable for the acts of its officials, 
employees, or agents. (emphasis added). 
 
 By amending the Act, Congress afforded comfort to victims by 
granting a private right of action to sue a foreign state.
110
 Cicippio-
                                                 
109
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Puleo had said that a federal cause of action to sue a foreign state 
would be in the right direction but that Congress had to act; it was not 
the courts’ duty to find an action where one did not exist.
111
 Victims of 
state-sponsored terrorism now enjoy expanded rights under the 
amended Act because Congress eliminated the inconsistent application 
of the law by clarifying its original intent to U.S. courts.”
112
  
 The D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to apply this new 
Amendment. For example, in Estate of Doe v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, an 
action was brought against Iran alleging that it materially supported a 
terrorist group which was responsible for bombing two U.S. Embassy 
facilities in Beirut, Lebanon where 58 foreign national employees and 
one U.S. national employee of the U.S. Government were working and 
therefore injured or killed as a result of the attack.
113
 The court held 
that where the plaintiffs had originally filed suit under the original 
FSIA exception and commenced a new action in a timely manner 
under the new FSIA exception, an action was available.
114
  Similarly, 
in Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Rep., the court reached the same conclusion 
and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed under the new FSIA terrorism 
exception.
 115
  Providing plaintiffs met the FSIA’s state-sponsored 
terrorism exception under Section 1605A, a private cause of action 
attached to the foreign state as well as an agent of the state.
116
   
 Although still challenging, the new FSIA exception provided 
relief to American citizens, employees or soldiers of the U.S. 
government, and sent a signal that their claims mattered.  Courts have 
held that those who brought claims under the original FSIA terrorism 
exception had a right of action under the new FSIA terrorism 
                                                 
 
111
 Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at 1036. 
        
112








 Id. at 16-17. 
  
115
 Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 736 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 
116
 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008). 
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  The courts retroactively applied the new right of action 
provided plaintiffs commenced an action within 60 days after the entry 
of judgment against the foreign state in a timely filed related action 
which arose out of the same incident.
118
  It is apparent that some 
jurisdictional and cause-of-action roadblocks were dismantled; 
families could start their healing processes.
119
 
                                                 
 
117
 See Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F.Supp.2d *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 784 F. Supp.2d *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Anderson v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (for a retroactive 
application analysis to claims that were previously rejected by terrorism victims). 
 
118
 See Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d *1 (plaintiffs allowed to retroactively apply the 
FSIA new amendment that created a new independent federal cause of action against 
foreign sovereign for terrorism-related claims, in an effort to seek punitive 
damages); Anderson v. The Islamic Rep. of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(where states-sponsored terrorism exception applied retroactively to the suit brought 
by several family members of servicemen who were severely injured during a 
bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut against Islamic Rep. of Iran and the 
Iranian Ministry of Information and Security); Murphy v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 740 
F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs and intervenors the right to 
retroactively apply the new FSIA provision against Iran for the bombing of the 
Marine barracks in Lebanon). 
 
119
 154 Cong. Rec. S54-01 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg).  
Mr. Lautenberg speaks in the Congressional hearing of the 110
th
 Congress, 
Second Session about the original intent and effects of the FSIA.  Mr. 
Lautenberg states, in part: 
In 1996, Congress created the “state sponsored terrorism 
exception” to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, FSIA. This exception 
allows victims of terrorism to sue those nations designated as state sponsors 
of terrorism by the Department of State for terrorist acts they commit or for 
which they provide material support. Congress subsequently passed the 
Flatow Amendment to the FSIA, which allows victims of terrorism to seek 
meaningful damages, such as punitive damages, from state sponsors of 
terrorism for the horrific acts of terrorist murder and injury committed or 
supported by them. 
Congress's original intent behind the 1996 legislation has 
been muddied by numerous court decisions. For example, the 
courts decided in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran that 
there is no private right of action against foreign governments-as 
opposed to individuals-under the Flatow Amendment. Since this 
20
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III. CURRENT EFFECT OF THE STATE-SPONSORED TERRORIST 
EXCEPTION & THE LEIBOVITCH DECISION 
 
A. Limitations of §1605A 
 
 Certain limitations still exist before a U.S. court will hear a claim 
under the FSIA’s terrorism exception: (1) the foreign state has to be 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism; (2) the claimant or victim 
has to be a U.S. national, member of the armed forces, or employee of 
the government; or (3) is an individual performing a contract awarded 
by the United States Government and acting within the scope of their 
employment.
120
  If the claimant fulfills these three elements, a U.S. 
                                                                                                                   
decision, judges have been prevented from applying a uniform 
damages standard to all victims in a single case because a victim's 
right to pursue an action against a foreign government depends 
upon State law. My provision in this bill fixes this problem by 
reaffirming the private right of action under the Flatow 
Amendment against the foreign state sponsors of terrorism 
themselves. 
My provision in this bill also addresses a part of the law 
which until now has granted foreign states an unusual procedural 
advantage. As a general rule, interim court orders cannot be 
appealed until the court has reached a final disposition on the case 
as a whole. However, foreign states have abused a narrow 
exception to this bar on interim appeals-the collateral order 
doctrine-to delay justice for, and the resolution of, victim's suits. In 
Beecham v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Libya has 
delayed the claims of dead and injured U.S. service personnel who 
were off duty when attacked by Libyan agents at the Labelle 
Discothe2que in Berlin in 1986. These delays have lasted for many 
years, as the Libyans have taken or threatened to take frivolous 
collateral order doctrine appeals whenever possible. My provision 
will eliminate the ability of state sponsors of terrorism to utilize 
the collateral order doctrine. My legislation sends a clear and 
unequivocal message to Libya. Its refusal to act in good faith will 
no longer be tolerated by Congress. 
 
120
 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(2)(i)-(iii)(2008); see also Michael Rosenhouse, J.D., 
Annotation, State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign States and 
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court will exercise subject matter and personal jurisdiction over their 
claims.  However, courts must be knowledgeable in their application 
of the federal cause of action or the private right of action enumerated 
under section 1605A(c). 
 
B. Leibovitch’s Outcome 
 
 During the summer of 2003, the Leibovitch family was traveling 
in their minivan on the Trans Israel highway near, Kalkilya, a town 
bordering the West Bank.
121
 Soon after crossing the West Bank, 
members of the Palestine Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”)
122
 crossed into Israel 
from the West Bank and opened fire on the Leibovitch family,
123
 
causing grave harm to two of the Leibovitch children.
124
 As a result of 
the attack, N.L., a seven-year-old Israeli national, died and S.L., a 
three-year-old American citizen, was seriously wounded by bullets 
that shattered bones in her right wrist and pierced her torso.
125
 The 
girls had two grandparents and two siblings in the minivan that also 
survived the attack.
126




 In 2008, the Leibovitch family brought suit against Iran for 
each family member in the minivan that was attacked by the PIJ and 
for N.L. and S.L’s parents (foreign nationals) who were not present 
during the attack. 
128
  After the trial court entered a default order 
against Iran, the court determined that “S.L. was injured in ‘an act of 
                                                                                                                   
their Property under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 
(2002). 
121
 Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012). 
122
Id.; see also Meir Litvak, Palestine Islamic Jihad – Background 
Information, Jewish Virtual Library, (April 27, 2013, 3:00 PM), 
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/tau56.html. 
123
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 562. 
124
  Id. 
125
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… extrajudicial killing’ under the FSIA exception for terrorism.”
129
  In 
addition, the district court found Iran vicariously liable for injuries that 
resulted from the PIJ’s attack because Iran had provided material 




 The Leibovitch court faced two determinations regarding section 
1605A’s jurisdictional scope.  The first issue was whether 
section1605A specifically tracks the new private right of action which 
excludes most foreign nationals even if they are family members, or 
whether Cicippio-Puleo’s pass-through approach (merely granting 
jurisdiction but no right to sue) survives Congress’ substantial revision 
of the FSIA’s terrorism provision.”
131
 The second issue was whether 






 First, the Seventh Circuit concluded that § 1605A tracks a new 
private right of action.
133
 The court concluded “that Congress intended 
to confer jurisdiction over the Leibovitchs’ [IIED] claim.”
134
 In doing 
so, the court analyzed Congress’ revision of Section 1605A and 
disengaged Cicippio-Puleo and its progenies’ previous arguments.
135
 
The Seventh Circuit found that Congress eliminated a huge 
inconsistency created by Cicippio-Puleo by “slightly amend[ing] the 
language to waive sovereign immunity if ‘neither the claimant nor the 
victim was a national of the U.S. … when the act upon which the 
claim is based occurred.’”
136
 Therefore, the court found that Congress 
“established a private right of action principally for American 
                                                 
129
 Id.; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008).  
130
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 562. 
131
 Id. at 564.   
132
 Id. at 572. 
133
 Id. at 569. 
134
 Id.  
135
 Id. at 570. 
136
 Id.at 570. 
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claimants while waiving sovereign immunity in a broader set of cases 
also involving American victims.”
137
 The court noted that Congress did 
not indicate that its Amendment narrowed the original scope of 
jurisdiction.
138
 Rather, the purpose of § 1605A(c) was to “extend 
punitive damages to foreign nations sponsoring terrorism and thereby 
allow the massive liability judgments [to] deter state support for 
terrorism.”
139
 Essentially, the court found that Congress intended for 
the Leibovitch’s to “‘have the benefit’ of the FSIA’s jurisdictional 
provisions even if they could not make use of the federal cause of 
action” created under the Flatow Amendment.
140
 
 Second, the Seventh Circuit determined that S.L. was a victim 
although her sister, N.L., was a foreign national and S.L. was killed by 
an extrajudicial killing.
141
  Based on § 1605A’s House Report, ‘“[the] 
intent of the drafters was that a family should have the benefit of these 
provisions if either the victim of the act or the survivor who brings the 
claim is an American citizen.”
142
  
 Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran defines victim as “those who 
suffered injury or died as a result of the attack and claimants as those 
whose claims arise out of those injuries or deaths but who might not 
be victims themselves.”
143
 S.L. was an American citizen and a victim 
of state sponsored terrorism when she was severely injured by bullets 
that shattered her torso and wrist.
144
 N.L., however, was murdered by 
an act of extrajudicial killing.
145
  
 The Seventh Circuit concluded that although S.L. was not a 
victim of extrajudicial killing, she was a victim of the same terrorist 
act that killed her sister because she suffered severe injuries as a result 
                                                 
137
 Id. at 571. 
138








 Id. at 570 (citing H.R. Rep. No.105-48, pt. 1, 2 (1996)).  
143
 Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
144
 Leibovitch, 697 F.3d. at 562, 570. 
145
 Id. at 572 (citing § 1605A(a)(1) (2008)).  
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  Therefore, jurisdiction existed over the Leibovitches 
claims that were derived from S.L.’s injuries.
147
  The Seventh Circuit 
reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded it for further 
proceedings consistent with its holding.
148
  The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that Section 1605A “not only confers jurisdiction but also 
includes a private right of action, a remedy not offered under any other 
exception to sovereign immunity.”
149
 The Seventh Circuit made the 
right decision by following Congressional intent and the language of 
the new Amendment to hold in favor of the Leibovitches.  Like many 
other families, the Leibovitches could receive a remedy for their 




 After the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception was 
expanded and narrowed, Congress eliminated legal inconsistencies 
enacted by U.S. courts. The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide many of 
these state-sponsored terrorism cases.  However, Leibovitch set a 
groundwork that lower courts in the Seventh Circuit must follow. In 
Leibovitch, the Seventh Circuit brilliantly explained and applied 
Congress’s intent to make this exception broader and more available to 
claimants because victims like S.L. will be deprived of adequate relief 
for their injuries without it.  The FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism 
exception was created and has always been advanced as a measure to 
deter foreign states from harming or killing American citizens. 
Furthermore, although it appears that the roadblocks to FSIA litigation 
have been dismantled, only time will tell when the Seventh Circuit 
decides more cases on this limited issue of the state-sponsored 
terrorism exception.   






 Id. at 573. 
149
 Id. at 570. 
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